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Abstract: - The nature of crime has internationalized. Therefore the transmitting of tracking and other status 
information between Law Enforcement Authorities should become an everyday business. The goal of this paper 
is to present a solution for international cooperation between law enforcement authorities. The proposed 
solution is based on Public Key Infrastructure operation model built for the financial sector companies. 
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1 Introduction 
Organized crime is a real threat around the globe. 
Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) are constantly 
seeking new technological recording, retrieving and 
monitoring solutions that would facilitate their 
combat against criminal organizations. Organized 
crime is an international business whereas 
operational LEAs are mostly national organizations. 
This creates a pressure for improved cooperation 
between LEAs. However, LEA organizations 
increasingly face interoperability issues at all levels 
(technical, operational and human) as they interact 
with other national, regional or international 
organizations. Not only assets and standards must be 
shared to empower joint responses to threats and 
crisis in an increasingly interconnected network, but 
also LEA organizations have to benefit from 
interoperability functionality in their day-to-day 
work.  
 
1.2 Administrative Challenges 
When an illegal incident has come to the knowledge 
of a law enforcement official, (s)he must act, and 
omitting to act may result in legal actions. Failing to 
obtain or share information from or with the 
partners, however, is mostly a voluntary action, 
although this information could prevent something 
unwanted. Furthermore, information sharing is often 
a complicated legal issue. Therefore, exclusion of 
information sharing is a much easier and safer 
choice for the own well-being of the officers. 
During crisis situations, the information 
exchange between people from different 
organizations is often done informally. These 
contacts are not institutionalized but are set up on a 
personal basis. Information is shared more easily 
with people that one knows and trusts [2]. If the 
information exchange is based from beginning to 
end on personal contacts, technology can create only 
limited help. Another disadvantage is a dependency 
of key persons. Absenteeism or loss of any 
individual should not be a threat to public safety. 
For these reasons, it is not acceptable that real-time 
information sharing in law enforcement between 
parties is based on personal contacts. 
At the EU-level, law enforcement organizations 
are exchanging information. EUROPOL is the 
European law enforcement organization which aims 
at improving the effectiveness and co-operation of 
the competent authorities in the Member States in 
preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of international 
organized crime [3]. EUROPOL’s task is to handle 
criminal intelligence. EUROPOL works mainly at a 
political level because, at the operational level, the 
pursuit of EUROPOL is simply too slow. Therefore, 
additional principles agreed to beforehand are 
needed. Currently, the exchange of information 
between LEA organizations helps just in the case of 
investigation or in statistics, but not at the 
operational level [4]. 
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1.3 Target of the Paper 
The ICT services supporting LEAs’ surveillance 
operations have usually been developed by national 
agencies, although some commercial devices are 
nowadays more widely in use. Many of the solution 
providers offer integrated systems, where sensors 
and mapping software are combined. Traditionally 
these systems are designed to be standalone services 
with no built-in way to communicate with other 
mapping systems. If some interface and protocol 
exists, the possibility to send properties and status 
information, so-called metadata, is still missing. 
Differences between devices, protocols and 
background systems have caused problems for 
international cooperation, simply due to lack of 
commonly agreed operational procedures and 
technical interfaces. [4] 
This paper presents a system how LEAs can 
exchange and share critical information. The paper 
answers how to provide efficiency and consistent 
Public Key Infrastructure functionality. The main 
question is how LEAs can identify the counterparty 
player securely. A LEA organization must be able to 
trust outputs and inputs. 
 
 
2 Proposed System  
Operational procedures should be as follows: 
Decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate 
level with coordination at the highest necessary 
level. The doctrine and training describe the way in 
which people, processes and technology combine to 
enhance decision making through the use of a 
common operating picture that provides mission 
critical information available to appropriate staff. 
When building up LEAs’ multinational sensor 
data exchange system, increased costs are minor 
when compared to benefits of international 
cooperation of authorities. Shared data should be 
considered critical information, and therefore 
appropriate data protection is required. More and 
more information and communications have become 
network-based, and accordingly the number of 
cyber-security incidents has increased. Although 
some nations have already established critical 
information infrastructure protection (CIIP) laws 
[5], international legislation is still missing. 
When an information infrastructure is installed 
and all functions are tested, the system should be 
tested against external and also internal cyber-
attacks to find possible vulnerabilities. Protection 
against external attacks and alternative routing with 
different IP addresses should be tested to provide 
necessary reliability for the system. Ref. [6] is one 
useful aid for planning security tests. 
Suitable ways for exchanging and sharing 
information between LEAs with no delays should be 
found; certain protocols and operational procedures 
are needed. The possibility to adopt already existing 
methods, for example from military organizations, 
should be considered. Currently the National Marine 
Electronics Association (NMEA) protocol [7] is 
used in some international situations, but for real-
time surveillance it is not sufficient. For example, 
the NMEA protocol does not provide the possibility 
to send metadata. 
 
2.1 Network Topology 
The lack of a transmission protocol is not the only 
issue in developing a multinational LEA network; 
also the network topology has to be agreed. Figure 1 
shows a possible network topology, in which all 
data transfer is encrypted and protected with a 
virtual private network (VPN). If the data should be 
encrypted inside VPN, the easiest way is to use a 
common Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) solution. 
All the public keys should be stored in one server 
connectible via VPN. 
When a connection to the data source of another 
LEA organization is needed, the transmitting server 
acquires needed public keys from the dedicated 
server, then encrypts and sends messages to the 
receiver. When the receiving server gets a new 
encrypted message, it automatically decrypts the 
data. 
Also, reliable ways to exchange additional 
information during cross-border operations is 
needed. This so-called metadata contains necessary 
information about the target and therefore should 
also be transmitted to the foreign LEAs. Metadata 
can include details about the target vehicle, possible 
risks of the target (e.g. armed) and preferred actions 
against the target. Like always, all data should be 
encrypted. All metadata should be sent along with 
the spatial information. 
 
2.2 PKI Operations Model 
Public Key Infrastructure operations model idea is 
based on ISF (Information Security Forum) best 
practices and modified for a financial company. The 
model idea is that it serves as a basic package to 
new PKI projects. The model is divided to 16 
different processes as shown in Figure 2. All these 
processes have their own role and owners. Process 
owners have divided to four different roles. 
Sometimes process significance might be trivial, 
other times the process might prove vital for the 
project. Good example is the Policy and standard 
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process. First time an organization must build this 
document, it might be a large undertaking for the 
organization. However, in the next project this 
process is only applied to updating valid policies. 
Everything starts from the LEAs operational 
needs. It is important that the operational part is 
leading this conversation. IT management and Risk 
management support this study. This is an important 
phase because it is here that most of the metrics are 
defined. In the end these metrics define how 
successful the project was. The model is PKI project 
best practices. This is the reason why all processes 
are described as separate processes. All phases give 
advice on what must be done and what should be 
done. In the end it is always a company or project 
decision what to do in the different kind of PKI 
projects. This is not a model for how to run a PKI 
project. It does not concern with how to come up 
with a project budget, or how to keep project 
meetings. When a certain project adapts this model 
it assumes that all basic project process practices are 
defined beforehand. Normally organizations have 
their own project model which they follow or they 
can follow the PMBOK guide [8]. 
Operational case phase is a regular operational 
process case. This process should come from the 
own operational environment of the LEA. There are 
no specific PKI demands in the operational case 
phase. From a security point of view these phases 
should have their own detailed guide on how to 
estimate what are the costs to security environment. 
An important question is how to estimate what is 
really needed so that future projects do not build 
extra secure or fully automated environments 
without any benefit. 
In the analysis of technical requirements the 
organization should follow known standards such as 
the ISO 27000 or PCI. A good example is the best 
practices in [9]. It is important to go through all in 
the analysis stage as an LEA can easily notice if 
some area, like the physical environment, is 
missing. Normally projects think only for valid 
environments. There might be similarities and 
projects can save on costs and time. Also, if 
environment is outsourced it helps environment 
deployment. 
Governance support, such as senior management 
support, is vital for the security projects. These are 
persons who can make decisions so projects avoid 
delays because of lack of decisions. The model 
gives basic knowledge for governance support but 
this is normally dependent on the manager. E.g., an 
inside project manager has better connections to 
senior management. Sometimes this is a good thing 
and at other times this is a problem. 
Operational impact phase needs more detailed 
information on how to evaluate real impacts. This 
phase needs a check list for the actors. There is 
always something that must be taken into 
consideration, which is the reason why a best 
practice check list is needed.  
Projecting phase is a standard stage in the 
projects. This phase should give more detailed 
information on where the project manager can find 
guidelines and best practices on how to set up a 
project.  
Design and specification phase is what to write 
so an environment can be built. This phase is more 
technical than the others. It is important that 
technical personnel of the project are participating. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Network Topology 
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At this phase all operational needs must be known 
by the project design group. These specifications 
should be reviewed with the operational personnel. 
Product and vendor mapping phase are the 
decisions on what service provider or program the 
company is using. This phase needs more 
information from e.g. ITIL; the project can find 
correct processes for finding right product and 
vendor. There should be e.g. specified RFO 
 
 
 Fig. 2     PKI Operations Model (modified from [10]) 
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(Request for Order) and RFP (Request for Proposal) 
processes.  
Service management, operational and 
administration phase is fully implemented from 
ITIL. Some special detail for PKI or security can be 
found. Generally speaking, these processes are 
almost same for the entire IT sector. The model 
should follow ITIL process steps with PKI 
information. 
The policy and standards phase is more detailed 
in PKI and security issues. PKI and security have 
their own security policies and practice statement 
models to follow. During this phase it is always 
important to remember that organizations have their 
own security policies which they must follow. 
Securing the trust base phase tells the company 
what was the PKI policy state because this phase is 
based on that. In this phase all the PKI policy stages 
must be checked so that everything is done as in the 
defined policy. The PKI policy is an inclusive guide, 
ranging from technical to legal issues. Therefore this 
phase needs time to pass.  
Deployment phase is about the technical issues. 
In this phase all plans to be used are built. It is very 
important to follow specifications so everything is 
done in the right order and in the right way. 
Normally in this phase it is noticed if something is 
not planned for. These new specification add-ons 
must be described and approved by the 
management. Also it is important to calculate new 
costs. 
Test and release phase is where the project needs 
more hands-on personnel because there are many 
different tasks. In a normal situation an organisation 
has its own test and release processes. If not, the 
organization should follow some known standard or 
best practice like ITIL. ITIL has already solved the 
basic problems with this phase. This implementation 
model should follow the ITIL process more. These 
basic ITIL processes need various authorities. 
Education and training phase is easiest to drop 
out from the plans. Yet it is still an important part. 
This phase is for the new users and for the rest of 
the organisation to know what this project focuses 
on. An organisation should have its own security 
education and training program. This training 
program should be only one part of the phase. The 
project has massive work to do if an organisation 
does not have any training program of its own. This 
must be taken care of in the project time table. 
The support and maintenance phase is important 
for continuity. LEAs should have already working 
support and maintenance processes. This is only for 
PKI implementation to those. Also this is lighter if 
services are outsourced because some services are 
provided by the vendor. LEAs should follow ITIL 
processes if the company does not have already 
these processes in place. During this phase the LEA 
must consider whether the PKI services are open 
always or can the hours be limited to business hours. 
The audit phase is compulsory for some sectors. 
This means that the LEA should have an audit 
process in place, such as specification audits and 
environment audits. Normally these are added to the 
own project processes of the target organisations. 
During the audit phase the LEA should use COBIT 
models.  
 
 
3 Discussions and Conclusions 
The result of this paper is the artifact of a Public 
Key Infrastructure operations model. This model 
offers the first steps on what must be done in a PKI 
project. It provides a partial answer to how to 
develop faster, more efficient, and safer PKI 
services. The results of the paper are derived from a 
real PKI project in the financial sector, but these 
kinds of projects are comparable with one another. 
The model phases in Figure 2 are not at the same 
operational level. Some phases are light 
business/operational decisions and so are detailed 
technical assignments. The model needs some kind 
of estimation about the timetable. Every phase 
should have its own estimated duration. Also, the 
model needs an estimate on what phases can be 
done at the same time and what phases are 
dependent on each other. It also needs the actors. 
Every phase should have information concerning 
who is responsible for that phase and who must 
participate in that phase. The project manager 
carries the overall responsibility but every phase 
needs its own responsible person such as the audit 
risk manager or, for technical environment setups, 
the technical architect. 
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